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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PAINFULLY PRESCRIBED: COULD TAKING OPIOIDS AS LEGAL
TREATMENT RESULT IN DISCRIMINATION UNCOVERED BY
THE ADA?
ABSTRACT
Amended in 2008, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), with its sole
mission to protect individuals with disabilities, is still gaping with holes in
coverage due to recent court interpretations. One such interpretation is the lack
of protection for patients being treated with legally prescribed medications.
With widespread misconceptions about opioid use and its effects, employers take
adverse action upon their employees seeking necessary treatment. This paper
will discuss the harmful consequences of courts narrowly interpreting the ADA
against coverage of these patients, as well as the potential revitalization of the
ADA’s mission in pending actions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cindy, a mother of three from the Midwest, struggled with lower back pain
for years after developing arthritis. Cindy tried relieving the pain through
physical therapy, Tylenol, muscle relaxants, and Aspirin. However, the sharp,
stabbing pain continues to keep her awake at night, prevents her from taking her
usual walks with her husband, and makes watching her son’s basketball games
difficult. After conducting a risk assessment on Cindy, Dr. Edmondson, Cindy’s
physician, prescribes Cindy hydrocodone, a short-acting, non-Schedule II opioid
with a 1 Morphine Equivalent Conversion Factor/mg of Opioid (MME), to be
taken for the next twelve weeks with biweekly check-ups. Though Cindy
sometimes feels nauseated, dizzy, and drowsy after taking the medication, she
is no longer in severe, stabbing pain. About a month into her treatment period,
Cindy, who has been a tax accountant for twenty-three years, is drug tested by
her employer. When Cindy tests positive for hydrocodone, her employer, who
read about the opioid epidemic online, terminates Cindy, saying he will not
tolerate someone disrupting his drug-free workplace environment. With
employment at-will and lack of statutory protection, Cindy has no legal recourse
for her termination.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), amended in 2008, sought to
protect disabled Americans, including individuals struggling with substantially
limiting impairments, having a history of such impairments, or being regarded
as impaired. 1 Nevertheless, while the amendment was intended to cover a
greater number of disabled individuals, court interpretations continue to leave a
gap in coverage protection. Though courts have definitively ruled on ADA
coverage of past addiction as a disability, they have not included the use of
drugs, nor their effects, for legally prescribed treatment in the statutory
definition of “disability.” Thus, discrimination while using legally prescribed
drugs is still possible under the Act. 2
With the growing awareness of opioid abuse and its effects on physical and
mental capabilities, courts have developed clear interpretations that dependence
and past addiction are covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act (ADAAA). 3 Yet, when opioids are used as legally prescribed,
despite the increased knowledge of their positive treatment results, courts have
been unclear in their interpretations of the ADAAA regarding short-term, legal

1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006) (amended 2008).
2. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Questions and Answers: The Americans with Disabilities Act and
Hiring Police Officers, ADA.GOV (March 2017), http://www.ada.gov/copsq7a.htm. See, e.g., Bates
v. Dura Auto. Sys., Inc., 650 F. Supp. 2d 754, 759, 761, 767–69, 772 (M.D. Tenn. 2009); Ferrari
v. Ford Motor Co., 96 F. Supp. 3d 668, 675 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
3. Is Addiction Considered A Disability By ADA?, KM&A, https://lawkm.com/addiction-dis
ability-by-ada/ (last visited July 21, 2019).
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opioid use. 4 Particularly, courts have traditionally said such use is not covered
under the ADA and, based on recent holdings, could find they are not covered
under the now broader amendments to the ADA as well. 5 This misapplication of
the ADA’s purposes could lead to a gap in coverage, where individuals with
serious pain and legally prescribed opioids to handle such pain could be
terminated from their jobs after a drug test or medical consultation. Whereas, if
these individuals failed to undergo their prescribed treatments and continued to
struggle with chronic pain, or if the treatment developed into an addiction, they
would be covered. To incentivize patients to follow prescribed treatments and
preclude their potential termination or other adverse action for doing so, courts
should find legally prescribed opioid use, even absent dependence or addiction,
is a disability under the ADAAA based on the established side effects and
generalized misperceptions of use.
This paper will first focus on legally prescribed opioid use (as opposed to
abuse, dependence, or addiction), its negative and beneficial consequences, and
the opioid addiction epidemic’s impact on misperceptions, even regarding
legally prescribed use. Section III will discuss how coverage has been
interpreted under the ADA and how the statute’s amendments have broadened
coverage. The following section will analyze how courts have been wrongly
interpreting coverage even after the ADAAA was adopted. Section IV will also
suggest a remedy for these interpretations to align with congressional intent of
broader coverage in a case recently filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). The paper will conclude with a discussion on the potential
consequences of lack of coverage under the ADAAA for employees seeking
pain relief or addiction-ending treatment.
II. THE INCREASING AWARENESS AND MISPERCEPTIONS OF OPIOID USE
Opioids are “a class of drugs naturally found in the opium poppy plant” and
are typically used as medicine to relieve “moderate to severe pain.” 6 Common
prescription opioids include: hydrocodone, like Vicodin; oxycodone, like
Oxycontin or Percocet; oxymorphone, like Opana; morphine; codeine; and
fentanyl. 7 With an estimated 116 million Americans struggling with chronic
pain, such as migraines, neck pain, or knee pain, and the $560 to $630 billion
annual cost of these chronic aches, pain relievers, including opioids, have proven
useful for the past five thousand years. 8

675.

4. See, e.g., Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 759, 761, 767–69, 771–72; Ferrari, 96 F. Supp. 3d at

5. Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 767–69, 771–72; Ferrari, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 675–76.
6. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, Prescription Opioids, DRUGABUSE.GOV 1 (June 2019),
https://d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/drugfacts-prescriptionopioids.pdf.
7. Id.
8. Corey S. Davis & Derek H. Carr, The Law and Policy of Opioids for Pain Management,
Addiction Treatment, and Overdose Reversal, 14 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2017).
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Today, patients in the United States use opioids for treatment of acute
postoperative pain, surgery-related chronic pain, severe cancer pain, pain in
individuals with HIV or AIDS, and opioid addiction itself. 9 Although there was
a nineteen percent reduction “in annual prescribing rate from 2006 to 2017,” the
prescribing rate in 2017 was still high—fifty-eight percent. 10 To gauge the
commonality of prescription opioids, consider that, in 2012, providers wrote 259
million prescriptions for opioids, which was enough for each individual
American adult to have a bottle of opioid pills. 11 As a result, by 2015, a third of
Americans had opioid prescriptions, and now, one in every ten employees is
generally under some dosage of opioids at work. 12 Prescriptions are more
common in smaller communities with more uninsured or unemployed
individuals and patients with diabetes, arthritis, or disabilities. 13
Generally, when prescribed by a doctor for short-term use, prescription
opioids are safe. 14 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends
such treatment in combination with nonpharmacologic therapy when the
expected benefits would likely outweigh the risks to the patient. 15 Assessing the
risk includes reviewing the history of the patient to assess likelihood that the
patient would abuse the drug. 16 While long-term use can be safe if effectively
monitored in some conditions, such as refractory severe nociception or
neuropathic pain, long-term use is only appropriate for a rare number of cases
and will not be the focus of this Comment. 17 Given the established benefits of
short-term opioid use, opioids as a secondary short-term treatment for relieving
pain may be embraced as long as this treatment is monitored and accurately

9. Id. at 5.
10. Prescription Opioid Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cd
c.gov/drugoverdose/data/prescribing.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2018) (defining MME as “a way
to calculate the total amount of opioids, accounting for differences in opioid drug type and
strength”). See also Calculating Total Daily Dose of Opioids for Safer Dosage, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/calculating_total_daily_
dose-a.pdf (last visited July 20, 2019) (considering twenty to fifty MME per day as “relatively low
dosages”).
11. Dawn J. Lanouette, Opioid Addiction Enters the Workplace, ABA (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/woman-advocate/articles/2018/opiateaddiction-workplace/.
12. Id.; Jack Benton, “Opioid Addiction at Work is a Major Challenge for Employers,” EHS
SAFETY NEWS AMERICA (Aug. 1, 2017), https://ehssafetynewsamerica.com/2017/08/01/opioid-ad
diction-at-work-is-a-major-challenge-for-employers-opiod-addiction-safety/.
13. Prescription Opioid Data, supra note 10.
14. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6, at 1.
15. Deborah Dowell et al., CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain – United
States, 2016, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Mar. 18, 2016, at 1, 17.
16. Id. at 18, 25.
17. See generally Jerome Schofferman, Long-Term Use of Opioid Analgesics for the
Treatment of Chronic Pain of Nonmalignant Origin, 8 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 279 (1993).
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assessed. 18 For this reason, best prescribing practices are that the use of opioids
should be temporary or episodic with periodic reviews.
Just as with other drugs, prescription opioids may have side effects. Some
opioid side effects include: “drowsiness, confusion, nausea, constipation,
euphoria, [and] slowed breathing.” 19 One source found “[a]s many as 80% of
patients taking opioids experience at least one side effect.” 20 The most common
side effects of opioids as treatment are “gastrointestinal, like constipation,
nausea, and vomiting.” 21 Opioids, however, also impact the central nervous
system through impaired concentration and memory problems, as well as
causing dry mouth and loss of appetite. 22 While most side effects tend to fade
away with time, “[l]ong-term opioid use can lead to respiratory depression.” 23
With this slowed breathing, hypoxia may develop from lack of oxygen in the
brain, possibly leading to “coma, permanent brain damage, or death.” 24
While these side effects affect patients differently based on the prescription,
some studies have shown that opioid treatment can have severe impacts on
bodily functions. One of the most prevalent side effects, constipation, is
experienced by forty to forty-five percent of patients, sometimes becoming so
severe that patients have to be hospitalized. 25 In addition, seventy-five percent
of patients who have been taking opioids for six months or more have sleep
apnea. 26
Side effects of opioids are compounded when opioids are misused, such as
taking the medicine longer or in a higher dosage than prescribed, taking
another’s prescription, or taking opioids solely for the high effect. 27 Misuse can
cause dependence or addiction, which are distinct in scientific terminology. 28
When an individual repeatedly uses a drug, causing his or her neurons to
function normally only if the drug is consumed, that individual develops a drug
dependence, whereas “[d]rug addiction is a chronic disease characterized by
compulsive, or uncontrollable, drug seeking and use despite harmful
consequences and long-lasting changes in the brain.” 29 Though addiction and
18. Dowell et al., supra note 15, at 8.
19. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6, at 2.
20. Allie Lemco Toren, Weighing the Benefits and Side Effects of Opioids, HEALTHGRADES
(last reviewed Feb. 3, 2018), https://healthguides.healthgrades.com/treating-opioid-induced-consti
pation/weighing-the-benefits-and-side-effects-of-opioids.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6, at 2.
25. AnGee Baldini et al., A Review of Potential Adverse Effects of Long-Term Opioid Therapy:
A Practitioner’s Guide, 14 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION CNS DISORDERS (June 14, 2012).
26. Id.
27. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6, at 1.
28. See id. at 3–4.
29. Id. at 3.
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dependence are not the focus of this Comment, misconceptions about those
behaviors are sometimes wrongly conflated with legal prescription drug
treatment. 30
With the growing awareness of opioid misuse in the United States, the
United States Department of Justice recognizes the pattern of abuse and fatalities
as an “epidemic.” 31 In fact, the United States “consumes more than 80% of the
world’s opioids,” but only makes up for less than five percent of the world’s
population. 32 In 2017, the United States saw approximately 11.4 million people
over twelve years old misuse opioids, which included approximately 7.3 percent
of people between eighteen and twenty-five years old. 33 According to the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, prescribed pain
relievers, which also included non-opioids in a particular study, were misused
by 11.1 million people in 2017. The study’s results provided that hydrocodone
products were the most commonly misused drugs. 34 Although the “epidemic” is
only related to the misuse of opioids, such as addiction or dependence,
misconceptions based on the generalized term “opioid epidemic” cause
“stigmatization and inappropriate treatment” of those using opioids as legally
prescribed. 35
While the growing awareness of the opioid epidemic is helpful at addressing
addiction as a major public health issue, both employers and courts continue to
hold misconceptions about opioid use for legal treatment based on societal
stereotyping of opioids as misused substances. In a press release by the EEOC,
EEOC Philadelphia District Director Jamie R. Williamson stated,
As the country grapples with an opioid addiction crisis, unfortunately there are
many myths and biases about people recovering from drug addiction and the
treatments for it. Under the ADA, employers may test for illegal drug use, but
medically prescribed suboxone or methadone are not illegal drugs. Rather, they
are common and effective treatments for individuals recovering from drug
addiction, and many side effects of those treatments must be assessed on an
individualized basis. 36
30. See Kelly Dineen, Addressing Prescription Opioid Abuse Concerns in Context:
Synchronizing Policy Solutions to Multiple Complex Public Health Problems, 40 L. & PSYCHOL.
REV. 45–46 (2016) (explaining how the broad term “opioid epidemic,” instead of opioid-related
overdoses, has caused doctors to discourage positive or value neutral pain treatment because all
opioid prescriptions are mistaken as causing addiction).
31. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., 2015 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT SUMMARY iii (2015).
32. Davis & Carr, supra note 8, at 5–6.
33. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND
MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2017 NATIONAL
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 19 (2018).
34. Id. at 18, 20.
35. Dineen, supra note 30, at 3–4.
36. Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Sues Appalachian Wood Products, Inc. for Disability
Discrimination (Oct. 9, 2018).
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Nick Szubiak, the Director for Clinical Excellence in Addictions within the
National Council for Behavioral Health, described how society perceives
addiction as a “moral failing” or “character defect.” 37 Therefore, tying opioid
use to addiction initiates the repercussion that society will misperceive those
who use opioids, even for legally prescribed treatment, as not “clean” because
society conflates all opioid use with addiction. 38 One result could be regarding
those who take opioids for pain relief, such as after surgery or for diabetes, as
having a “moral failing” simply for getting relief and treating them as if they are
addicted to the drug, rather than simply experiencing side effects. This societal
conflation causes unfair discrimination for those legally taking opioids for
medical purposes.
III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADAAA
The ADA, signed into law on July 26, 1990, was passed in order to prohibit
discrimination against individuals with disabilities, as well as end surrounding
stereotypes and set enforceable standards of care. 39 According to Title I of the
Act, “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate on the basis of disability in regard
to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment.” This requirement of the Act particularly focuses
on terms of employment. 40 A qualified individual is “an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires.” 41 A “disability” means that there is a “physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” there is a record of an
impairment, or an individual is regarded as having an impairment. 42
Under the ADA, coverage for legal prescription drug use has been construed
narrowly, not covering employees, even when employees produce evidence of a
prescription. For example, in Bates v. Dura Automotive Systems, Inc., seven
former employees of a glass window manufacturing company, Dura, challenged
a drug testing policy, which prohibited the use of legal prescription drugs, such
as Xanax, Lortab, and Oxycodone, “if such use adversely affected safety,
company property or job performance.” 43 This type of policy was generally
acceptable under the ADA in that it reinforced the employer’s ability to remove

37. Nick Szubiak, Discrimination & the Opioid Crisis 10 (presentation available at https://ccs
me.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2017-03-01-Discrimination-and-the-Opioid-Crisis.pdf).
38. Id. at 30.
39. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2006) (amended 2008).
40. Id. § 12112(a).
41. Id. § 12111(8).
42. Id. § 12102(1).
43. Bates v. Dura Auto. Systems, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758–59, 761 (M.D. Tenn. 2009).
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employees who directly threaten the work environment, as will be discussed
later in this section. 44
If an employee tested positive for one or more of the twelve tested
medications, Dura compared the adverse warnings of that drug or drugs with
whether there was a listed danger in operating equipment or machinery. 45 If
there was a warning, Dura sent a letter to the employee that he or she would be
placed on a thirty-day leave of absence and the employee had to transition to a
different drug or stop using the drug. 46
After seven employees tested positive, they produced letters from their
doctors that the drugs would not affect their work performance and refused
Dura’s request that they take other medications. 47 Dura did not consider the
letters, despite acknowledging that the positive tests were a result of their taking
legal, properly prescribed prescription drugs, and the employees, who continued
taking the prescribed medication, sued under the ADA after they were
terminated. 48
The trial court applied the original rule under the ADA, rather than the
amended version, because the ADA was in place at the time the conduct
occurred. 49 The court found that the employees’ conditions did not “qualify
[them] as disabled.” The court reasoned that the employees did not fall under the
first prong of having an impairment, as a result of their underlying physical or
mental pains, that substantially limited a major life activity. 50 The court reasoned
that the only potentially impacted major life activity was “working,” but this was
not actually impacted because the employees were able to work. 51
This is important in the context of legally prescribed drugs specifically
because, similar to Bates, employers typically discover the use of opioids
through drug testing and may respond to positive drug tests by retaliating against
employees because they could pose a danger to the workplace environment. 52
Once an employee tests positive for a drug test and the employer seeks to take
actions against the employee, the employee must, under the first prong, show
that he or she has an impairment that limits a major life activity. 53

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2017).
Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 759–60.
Id. at 760.
Id.
Id. at 760, 763.
Id. at 767 n.3.
Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 767.
Id.
NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, THE PROACTIVE ROLE EMPLOYERS CAN TAKE: OPIOIDS IN THE
WORKPLACE 4 (2019).
53. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2017).
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Originally, under the ADA, what constituted a “major life activity” was
construed narrowly. 54 Employees could try to claim the impacted major life
activity was working, but this raised the question of whether they were
unqualified for their job positions with reasonable accommodation and could
therefore be terminated. 55 Under the narrow interpretation, claiming other major
life activities was difficult, and even if those were claimed, the employer could
still show the employee was not qualified because he or she could not perform
the essential functions of the job. 56 Employees, like those in Bates, may test
positive for a drug test even if work is not impaired. After these employees test
positive to a drug that has a list of negative side effects, employers may put
employees’ qualifications and ability to do the job at issue.
For example, prior to the drug test, employees may not have been impaired
in their functioning. Once employees are tested, employers argue that the side
effects—the warnings on the drug labels, such as difficulty while operating
heavy machinery—impact work safety. If the employee wants to claim a major
life activity is affected, he or she must also show he or she is qualified, which
the employer has already questioned through the positive drug test and adverse
warning label. In Bates, one plaintiff stated she was able to clean, shop, cook,
and walk, and she never had any safety violations while on prescribed
medications. 57 Therefore, because she was taking the prescribed medication, she
was able to do most of her daily activities, but in order to protect herself under
the ADA from termination, she argued she was still in pain that affected her
work, which was difficult because she was taking the medication in order to
avoid being in pain at work. Essentially, she was faced with two options. Her
first option was to not follow treatment recommendations and to therefore be
protected as having an underlying impairment (chronic pain) that affected her
work. Her second option was to take the medication to relieve her pain and to
argue that she is still impaired in some fashion, either by the underlying pain or
the side effects of the medication. Since work qualifications were put at issue
with the drug test and the definition of “major life activities” was narrowly
construed by courts, arguing that she was not impaired at work, but rather in
another major life activity, would be difficult, and arguing she was impaired at
work could conflict with her ability to qualify for the job position.
Precedent under the ADA required a higher standard for “working” as a
major life activity, so the plaintiff needed to show he or she could not work in a

54. See ADAAA Rules Expand Definition of Working as Major Life Activity, PARKERPOE (Oct.
9, 2009), https://www.parkerpoe.com/news/2009/10/adaaa-rules-expand-definition-of-workingas-major.
55. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)–(b) (2017).
56. Id.; see ADAAA Rules Expand Definition of Working as Major Life Activity, supra note
54.
57. Bates v. Dura Auto. Sys., Inc., 650 F. Supp. 2d 754, 760 (M.D. Tenn. 2009).
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class of jobs. 58 In Bates, the plaintiffs “were all able to perform their jobs at the
time they were terminated.” 59 Those plaintiffs were able to show the reason they
were on medication, such as for general ailments, diabetes, or asthma, impacted
a major life activity. Still, the court did not find the plaintiffs to “qualify as
disabled” because the medical conditions needed to be more specific to a class
of jobs. 60 For example, one plaintiff’s asthma did not constitute a disability in
working because she could perform other job positions, just not the task of
priming. 61
In Bates, the plaintiffs also argued under the second prong of ADA coverage
that they had “histor[ies] of diagnosed medical impairments, have suffered
injuries on the job, or have taken leave under the Family Medical Leave Act.” 62
The plaintiffs only occasionally missed work for surgeries or accidents, but there
was no evidence of “continuing, long-term impairment,” so the court found there
was no record of impairment covered under the second prong. 63
With a greater understanding on legal opioid treatment, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention has stated that “[t]he effectiveness of short-term
opioid therapy has already been established.” 64 For example, opioids are useful,
as previously mentioned, for short-term treatment of opioid addiction or chronic
pain, like the treatment prescribed to the plaintiffs in Bates. 65 By not considering
this type of pain as a history of impairment simply because the incidents were
“isolated,” rather than “long-term,” the court seems to suggest that the plaintiffs
who seek legal, short-term opioid treatment are in a less favorable legal position
than if they had not followed the treatment because they may potentially lose
their jobs following drug testing. The court seems to suggest that plaintiffs who
suffer through addiction or chronic pain are in a better legal position because
their job positions would be protected under those circumstances. As will be
discussed, post-ADAAA statutory language suggests that legislative intent
would prefer a different outcome by suggesting that those with “episodic” pain
should be considered disabled and protected under the Act. 66
In Bates, the plaintiffs also failed under the third prong because, though Dura
regarded the plaintiffs as a safety risk, the ADA required the plaintiffs to be
regarded as “disabled” from a class of jobs, which the court found was the not
case. 67 However, the facts seem to suggest that the employer did not consider
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id. at 767.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 768.
Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 768.
Id.
Dowell et al., supra note 15, at 8.
Davis & Carr, supra note 8; Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 762.
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (2017).
Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 768–69.
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individual employee records, nor the doctors’ notes that the drugs would not
impact ability to work, suggesting the employer did, in fact, generalize employee
capability purely based his or her use of opioids. Today, the same plaintiffs
would be less likely to face the same outcome because the purpose of the ADA
is to diminish stereotyping. 68 Because of the difficulty in meeting the “class of
jobs” standard, the ADAAA broadened the scope of the third prong and removed
the requirement that it needed to apply to a broad class of jobs. 69 Additionally,
the “regarded as” prong no longer requires that the disability impact a major life
activity. 70 Based on these changes, we would expect plaintiffs to be in a better
position to argue for coverage under the ADAAA.
Because of interpretations like Bates, where the ADA was construed
narrowly and did not provide intended coverage, Congress rejected narrow
decisions and EEOC regulations by amending the ADA. 71 The ADAAA was
signed into law on September 25, 2008 to expand coverage and promote
successful claims under the ADA. 72 While the ADAAA did not change the
definition of disability under the law, it modified the application of the ADA by
advising the EEOC to redefine “substantially limits,” by expanding the list of
“major life activities” to include more activities and bodily functions, by
clarifying that episodic impairments could be disabilities, by changing the
definition of “regarded as” to not include “major life activity,” and by not
entitling claims under the “regarded as” prong to reasonable accommodation. 73
For the purposes of this Comment, we will focus on the expansion of “major life
activities,” episodic impairments, and the reclassification of “regarded as.”

68. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2006) (amended 2008);
see Bates, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 771–72.
69. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12102(4)(C).
70. See id. § 12102(3)(A).
71. See id. § 12101(b); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N., NOTICE CONCERNING
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008; Comparison of the
ADA (as Construed by the Courts) and the ADA Amendments Act in the House (H.R. 3195) and as
Passed by the Senate (S. 3406), DSPSSOLUTIONS 1, 1 http://www.dspssolutions.org/sites/default/
files/resources/differencesbetweenadaandadaaa_001.pdf (last visited July 22, 2019).
72. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12101(b); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N., supra note 71; Comparison of the ADA (as Construed by the Courts) and the ADA
Amendments Act in the House (H.R. 3195) and as Passed by the Senate (S. 3406), supra note 71,
at 1.
73. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12102(1–4); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N., supra note 71; Comparison of the ADA (as Construed by the Courts) and the ADA
Amendments Act in the House (H.R. 3195) and as Passed by the Senate (S. 3406), supra note 71,
at 3.
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A.

The ADAAA Changed Testing Points to Expand Disability Coverage
1. The Expansion of “Major Life Activities”

Under the first prong, the plaintiff must show he or she is substantially
impaired in a major life activity. 74 In the case of legally prescribed opioids, users
are likely taking the medication to reduce chronic pain. 75 This underlying
chronic pain could potentially be protected as an impairment under the ADAAA
definition of disability. However, by taking prescription opioids, individuals
should be improving their health, considering that they are taking the medication
for pain relief. Because of this mitigating effect, patients may instead argue that
the effect of using opioids in itself is an impairment. As mentioned above,
opioids can have serious effects on users, such as drowsiness, nausea, and
slowed breathing. 76 If patients are experiencing side effects that impact a major
life activity or the underlying chronic or intermittent pain is substantially
limiting in itself, then they should be considered impaired in one or more major
life activities for the first or second prongs.
As mentioned above, given the nature of drug testing, employees previously
did not have as much flexibility in what they argued as major life activities
because the meaning of “major life activity” was construed narrowly and an
employer, by drug testing employees, claimed these employees were not
qualified. 77 Employees could argue they were either not substantially impaired
in their work, thus not falling under the ADA’s first or second prongs unless
arguing a different major life activity, or that they were substantially impaired
in work as a major life activity, either based on the underlying condition or the
medication’s side effects.
The term “major life activit[y]” was expanded when the ADAAA added a
list to further define “major life activities” as “includ[ing], but…not limited to,
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 78 In addition to this nonexhaustive list, general “major bodily functions,” including immune system,
neurological, and circulator functions, could also fall under the new ADAAA
definition.
Recall, though, that the ADA, and now the ADAAA, only applies to
qualified individuals, who are individuals that can “perform the essential

74. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12102(1)(a).
75. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6, at 1, 3.
76. Id. at 2.
77. See ADAAA Rules Expand Definition of Working as Major Life Activity, supra note 54.
78. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12102(2); The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Frequently
Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/faqs/ADAfaqs
.htm#content (last visited Jan. 12, 2019).
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functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 79
Thus, if employees argue they are substantially impaired by the use of opioids,
such as with drowsiness or decreased cognitive ability, they have to show the
impairment is affecting a major life activity. Employees have to address whether
they are able to perform the essential functions of their jobs or they can do so by
reasonable accommodation without being a direct threat. If employers claim
employees are not qualified after a positive drug test of an opioid with a safety
warning, employees run the risk of not being classified as “qualified individuals”
because they cannot perform the essential functions of the job, especially if their
job positions are safety-intensive, such as operating heavy machinery, and the
drug side effects could impact such tasks. 80 By conducting drug testing,
employers put such side effects of opioids at issue for employees who take
prescription opioids for purposes deemed medically necessary.
The likelihood that the same plaintiffs as those in Bates could make the same
argument today, but be covered under the ADAAA, is higher because the ADA’s
amendment was passed in order to expand the definition of “major life
activity.” 81 With an expanded definition, plaintiffs could better argue that there
were other major life activities impacted rather than just working. Even if
employers claim plaintiffs are not qualified to work after a positive drug test, the
plaintiffs can argue they are not impacted at work but are impacted in other areas
of their lives. With the non-exhaustive list in the ADAAA, the definition of
“major life activity” is broadened. The broad definition is less likely to conflict
with job qualifications than a narrow definition of major life activities, such as
simply working.
The purpose of the ADAAA was to expand protection by broadening the list
of “major life activities.” Opioids impact major life activities, such as sleeping,
performing tasks, or breathing. Thus, if employees argued they were not
impaired at work and there were no safety complaints about the employees’
work like in the Bates case, the employees could argue they have impairments
outside of work. In such a case, there would be little likelihood of contradicting
job qualifications. Under the expanded definition of the ADAAA, plaintiffs
would be in a better position to argue impairment of a major life activity outside
of work based on the effects experienced from opioid treatment.

79. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12111(8).
80. Matthew S. Effland, Disability Accommodation Under the ADA, AMERICAN BAR,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/am/2014/1h_disability_accomm
odation.pdf (last visited July 22, 2019).
81. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12102(2); The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Frequently
Asked Questions, supra note 78.
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2. The Addition of Episodic Disability Coverage
The ADAAA added any episodic impairment that “substantially limit[s] a
major life activity when active” to the definition of disability. 82 Episodic
impairments do not have to be present all the time, but only have to be recurring,
such as epilepsy, hypertension, or major depressive disorder. 83 Since episodic
chronic pain is decidedly covered by the ADAAA, this section focuses on the
episodic use of legally prescribed opioids and its episodically experienced side
effects. 84 Because of the nature of prescription medication, employees may not
be constantly influenced by the side effects of opioids. To ensure that employees
are not under the influence while at work, employers conduct drug tests. 85
If prescription drugs are used off-site, there may still be side effects if, at the
time the employee was tested, the drug is still in his or her system. Whether the
employee tests positive depends on the type of testing, the type of opioid, and
how the drug was used. 86 The active ingredients of opioids only remain in blood
for a few hours, so instead of blood tests, immunoassay urine tests are used to
detect certain drugs days after use. 87 The immunoassay test, though, cannot
distinguish between legal and illegal use of opioids. 88 In fact, simply eating
enough poppy seeds can result in a positive immunoassay result. 89
Therefore, because the nature of drugs is unique in that they can be detected
in blood or urine samples, even if a user is not experiencing any side effects, the
user will once again be put in a situation where qualification to work is at issue
if the test is positive. This is the case even if the employee’s work has not been
claimed as “impaired.” Since the employer’s drug test only measures use, rather
than impairment, and mere use can result in a positive drug test, the prescription
drug patient may have felt the side effects episodically, though at times of the
day other than work. By extending coverage to episodic impairments, the
ADAAA should cover the gap that would be felt if periodic effects were not
covered.

82. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12102(4)(D).
83. Questions and Answers on the Final Rule Implementing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/ada_qa_final_
rule.cfm (last visited July 22, 2019).
84. See Eastman v. Research Pharm., Inc., No. 12-2170, 2013 WL 3949236, at *1, 8–9 (E.D.
Penn. Aug. 1, 2013).
85. Frieda Paton, Managing Opioids in the Workplace, WORKPLACE TESTING (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://www.workplacetesting.com/2/4050/occupational-health-and-safety/managing-opioids-inthe-workplace.
86. See Opioids, 237 HR SERIES POLICIES & PRAC. 11 (Jan. 2019).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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3. The New Standards of the “Regarded As” Clause
To fall under the ADAAA protections, an employee only has to fall under
one of the three prongs. An employee can avoid having to show that a major life
activity was impaired by claiming he or she falls under the third prong, rather
than the first or second prongs, of the definition of disability. 90 If a plaintiff
argues that he or she has a claim under the third prong, the plaintiff must show
that he or she is regarded as having an impairment. 91 The impairment does not
have to impair a major life activity, unlike the other two prongs, thus the third
prong may provide a more encouraging route for some employees who claim
they are not literally impaired, but rather are perceived as such, while at work. 92
However, this prong does not apply to impairments that are “transitory and
minor.” 93 These include impairments “with an actual or expected duration of 6
months or less.” 94 To show this prong, the employee must show that the
employer thought or would expect the impairment to last at least six months.
This lowered the previous standard, where plaintiffs had to show that they were
regarded as impaired in a major life activity.
B.

An Employer’s Defense: How the ADAAA Provides Tools to Employers’
Benefit

Though the ADAAA broadened coverage, the ADA and its amendments still
protect employers by limiting certain drug use in the workplace that could
impact productivity and safety. Recent studies suggest that costs of opioids are
a large factor of employer concern, since opioid abuse costs employers about ten
billion dollars annually to lost productivity and absenteeism. 95 As many as “onethird of prescription painkillers paid for by employer-funded plans are being
abused.” 96 But, disability coverage does not extend to the use of illegal drugs. 97
“[I]llegal use of drugs” does not include “the use of a drug taken under
supervision by a licensed health care professional, or other uses authorized by
the Controlled Substances Act or other provisions of Federal law.” 98 Also, in the
Code of Federal Regulations, this statutory language has been interpreted to
mean that legal use of prescribed drugs does not deprive a person of protection
90. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (2017).
91. Id.
92. See id. at § 12102(3)(A).
93. Id. at § 12102(3)(B).
94. Id.
95. Riia O’Donnell, As Opioids Hit the Workforce, Employers are Forced to Improvise,
HRDIVE (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.hrdive.com/news/as-opioids-hit-the-workforce-employersare-forced-to-improvise/449471/; Benton, supra note 12.
96. O’Donnell, supra note 95.
97. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6)(A) (2006) (amended
2008).
98. Id.
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under the ADA; yet, the Code does not specify whether such use is protected,
just that the use is not excluded. 99 Thus, the regulation leaves open the
possibility that legal prescription drug use could be covered by the ADAAA, but
does not specifically cover it, so it can still be excluded if interpreted as such.
High costs of abuse and the lack of statutory protection heighten employer
concerns of detecting drug abuse in the workplace, thus increasing the use of
drug tests. Employers may still require drug testing to promote a drug-free
workforce of prescription medications. 100 Employers conduct drug testing,
including those of legally prescribed drugs, in order to address danger of injuries,
lost productivity, and potential liability. 101 Their argument is that the opioid side
effects of “drowsiness, poor memory and confusion, [and] decreased cognitive
functioning” can “lead to altered judgement as well as slower movement and
reaction time in the workplace.” 102 If the employee tests positive for prescription
medications, the employer should ask the employee to provide his or her
prescription. 103
If employees are covered by the ADAAA after the upcoming case, EEOC v.
Appalachian Wood Products, Inc., then upon learning an applicant or employee
uses opioids, an employer may need to consider its practices and procedures for
drug testing, terminations, and transfers. Employers may also have the added
cost of drug use as a reasonable accommodation, a policy development that has
been hindered by “lack of understanding and adequate support.” 104 Before
taking adverse employment action, employers must conduct an individualized
assessment of whether the treatment affects job performance with reasonable
accommodation. 105 This means that employers cannot have “blanket” policies
forbidding any exceptions, like prescription drugs. 106 Without blanket
prohibitions, employers have less flexibility and efficiency in adverse
employment decisions because the decisions must be specific. Yet, the
individualized assessment also ensures that employers do not take “adverse
employment action against employees or applicants based on any prejudice,

99. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(a)(2) (2018); Tiffanie Benfer et al., Addiction Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, AM. B. 1, 11 https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law
/2017/11/conference/papers/Kuczynski-ADDICTION-UNDER-THE-AMERICANS-WITH-DIS
ABILITIES-ACT.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited on Sept. 29, 2018).
100. David L. Johnson, Managing Issues Posed by Opioids in the Workplace, TENN. EMP. L.
LETTER, 2017, at 3.
101. Paton, supra note 85.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Benjamin E. Widener, Opioid Accommodation: Overview, Case Study and
Recommendations, N.J. L. JOUR. (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2018/08/10/
opioid-accommodation-overview-case-study-and-recommendations/?slreturn=20190019123417.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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misperception or lack of information about the employee’s lawful use of
prescription drugs.” 107
Even if an employee can show he or she has a disability and he or she can
perform the essential functions of the job, the employer can still discriminate
against the employee if the employee poses a “direct threat.” 108 This defense
allows employers to fire, refuse to hire, demote, etc., employees who present a
significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of that employee or
others, which cannot be eliminated or reduced by a reasonable
accommodation. 109 If the opioid treatment is affecting workplace safety, such as
in a situation where a patient taking prescription opioids is operating heavy
machinery or doing physical labor for his/her job, the employee may be
transferred or terminated, and the employer will still be in compliance with the
law. 110 This allows employers to maintain the same protections they currently
have—that if they truly have an issue with the employee in terms of safety, the
direct threat defense will protect employer workplace decisions.
Furthermore, the direct threat defense also allows employers to stay aware
of safety threats to the workplace, hire employees who can perform their job
functions, and still terminate employees who are illegally abusing prescription
drugs. To avoid liability, employers can simply have a specialized process for
employees who test positive for legally prescribed drugs, have written job
descriptions that detail what would be a safety concern and what is essential for
the job, and focus on employee performance rather than history of abuse. 111
Though employers are losing some ability to terminate at-will those employees
who are taking legally prescribed opioids, they are in turn gaining employees
who, hopefully, are in less chronic pain, recovering from a history of addiction,
or benefitting from one of the other short-term effects that could increase
productivity through legally prescribed treatment.
With employer protections in place as well, based on the current statutory
language, though it may be difficult, employees who are being discriminated
against based on their legally prescribed use of opioids can show that major life
activities are affected or that there was a sustained perception of being regarded
as disabled. As mentioned earlier, Congress passed the amendment to broaden
the scope and application of the ADA, so, when faced with this language, courts
should construe the “major life activity” and “regarded as” classifications as in
line with our understanding of opioid use, treatment and prescribing behavior,
and employer misperceptions.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(3), 12113(a)–(b) (2006).
Id.
See id.
Widener, supra note 104.
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IV. CORRECTING THE APPLICATION OF THE ADAAA IN LEGAL OPIOID
PRESCRIPTION USE
Despite the legislative and regulatory intent to broaden statutory coverage
for disabled individuals, courts continue to misapply a narrow interpretation that
could in a way allow for legal prescription drug use to fall outside of coverage. 112
In a recently filed suit, EEOC v. Appalachian Wood Products, Inc., a district
court has the opportunity to correctly apply broader coverage for those seeking
treatment through legal opioid use. 113
As the potential widespread misapplication of anti-discrimination law
looms, the EEOC filed a lawsuit on September 27, 2018 against a cabinet
supplier, Appalachian Wood Products, Inc., claiming testing of legally
prescribed drugs is a violation of the ADAAA. 114 According to the complaint,
Appalachian Wood Products, Inc. did not hire job applicants when prescription
use was disclosed to the employer’s contracted medical provider. 115 One
applicant, Daub, was taking prescribed Suboxone to treat his seven-year opioid
addiction following a back injury. 116 The use of opioids “interfered with major
life activities such as eating, sleeping and interacting with others.” 117 However,
on his job application, Daub responded that he was not taking medication that
impaired his cognitive ability or motor function skills because he had not
experienced either of those specific impairments as a result of his prescription. 118
After Daub disclosed the prescribed treatment to the employer’s chiropractor,
the employer withdrew its offer of employment. 119 The complaint claims,
“Defendant refused to hire Daub on the basis of his record of a disability, past
drug addiction, drug addiction recovery and related medical treatment, and
because he was regarded as disabled . . . .” 120
This is the first case filed in which the plaintiff specifically argued that legal
opioid prescription use is a disability under the ADAAA through side effects felt
outside of work. Based on court interpretations of legal opioid treatment under
the ADA and surrounding dicta on the ADAAA, however, we should be
concerned about how courts may interpret the recent filing. We can use these

112. See Brynn Stylinski, Narrow Definitions: The Courts’ Resistance to the ADA Amendments
Act, UNIV. CIN. L. REV. (May 14, 2015), https://uclawreview.org/2015/05/14/narrow-definitionsthe-courts-resistance-to-the-ada-amendments-act/.
113. See generally Complaint at 1, EEOC v. Appalachian Wood Prods., Inc., No. 18-00198 (D.
Pa. Sept. 27, 2018); Press Release, supra note 36.
114. Complaint at 5–6, supra note 113; Press Release, supra note 36.
115. Complaint at 5, supra note 113.
116. Id. at 4.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 5.
120. Complaint at 5, supra note 113.
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concerns to frame arguments for greater protection of those using opioids for
legal treatment.
A.

An Individual Legally Using Opioids Can Be Considered Actually
Disabled

In order to meet the definition of “disabled,” an individual who claims he or
she faced adverse action in the workplace based solely on use of legally
prescribed opioids may first argue that his or her impairment “substantially
limits one or more major life activities.” 121 However, even after the intended
expansion of coverage under the ADAAA, district courts in the same jurisdiction
as Bates and affirmed by the Sixth Circuit continue to misapply the law against
individuals legally using prescribed drugs. 122 In Ferrari v. Ford Motor
Company, after the plaintiff suffered a neck injury in 2000, he took pain
medications and obtained a placement in human resources as a reasonable
accommodation. 123
After his neck pain improved in late 2012 and wanting a new position
without restrictions, the plaintiff sought for his restrictions to be lifted by the
company physician, Dr. Brewer. 124 Dr. Brewer met with the plaintiff’s treating
physician, Dr. Kole, regarding the removal of the neck-related physical
restrictions and the plaintiff’s use of Valium and morphine documented as of
January 7, 2013. 125 Although the plaintiff was not restricted by the neck pain,
the dependence on opioids was determined as a restriction, and Dr. Kole found
that the “plaintiff could physically perform the duties in the RMI position
description, but would require three months to be weaned off of his pain
medications.” 126 There was conflicting evidence on whether the plaintiff was
actually still taking the opioids, but regardless, the plaintiff was not transferred
to the desired position. 127
The plaintiff filed a discrimination suit, claiming his disability was his neck
injury under the ADA, which the court misapplied, rather than applying the
ADAAA. 128 Though the court found that the underlying disability, the neck
injury, was a disability and covered by the ADA, the court still analyzed whether
the plaintiff’s use of opioids was a disability because the use was the “stated
basis for defendant’s adverse employment decision.” 129 As in Bates, the court
121.
122.
2015).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2017).
See generally Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 96 F. Supp. 3d 668, 668, 678–79 (E.D. Mich.
Id. at 670–71.
Id. at 671.
Id.
Id.
Ferrari, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 671–72.
Id. at 672, 674.
Id. at 675.
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wrongly used the employer’s basis for termination, limitations on work because
of legally prescribed drugs, rather than the employee’s actual claim to analyze
the definition of disability. The court reasoned, then, that opioid use “cannot
serve as the basis for an actual disability” because it cannot limit a major life
activity. 130 The court cited a case finding that addiction can only be a disability
through the second and third prongs, conflating the plaintiff’s legal opioid
treatment with the rule for “drug-addicted individuals.” 131 Given our knowledge
of the uses and effects of legal prescription opioid use, this generalized bar on
protection is an improper application of the ADAAA.
The conflation of legally prescribed treatment with addiction should not be
used to categorically exclude those seeking treatment from the protections of the
first prong of the ADAAA. The congressional intent of the ADA’s amendment
was greater protection. Thus, if a plaintiff can show a major life activity is
substantially limited, the plaintiff should be able to show the first prong, even if
as a result of legal drug use. 132 As mentioned earlier, we are becoming
increasingly aware of opioid side effects, such as drowsiness, altered eating
habits, and behavioral changes, and the way such effects impact various life
activities outside of work. 133 Therefore, as a matter of public policy, as well as
following congressional intent, the courts should broaden the interpretation of
“major life activities” to mirror our knowledge of legal opioid use side effects,
rather than categorically exclude and conflate legal prescription drug use with
addiction.
This expansion could be applied in EEOC v. Appalachian Wood Products,
Inc. if the plaintiffs avoid claiming that “work” is the impaired major life activity
and, instead, argue that the effects of their legal opioid prescription impair other
areas of their lives, such as sleeping or eating. In the upcoming EEOC case, the
plaintiffs first argue that the class of applicants was discriminated against based
on their “actual disabilities.” 134 One of the applicants, Daub, who was legally
taking prescribed Suboxone to treat a previous addiction, argued he had a
disability from the effects of the prescription that substantially limited major life
activities, such as eating, sleeping, and interacting with others. 135 Based on the
expanded definition of “major life activity,” which includes eating and sleeping,
the court should find these impacts constitute a disability under the first prong.
As mentioned earlier, the employer’s drug testing or application questions
may put at issue whether the impairments also limit work ability. Therefore, the
employee should not be hired because he or she cannot perform the essential

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
See The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 78.
NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6.
Complaint at 1, supra note 113.
Id. at 4.
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functions of the job and is therefore not qualified. 136 However, the plaintiffs do
not have to argue work is the impaired major life activity, thus reducing the
likelihood that they might be deemed unqualified. Assuming cognitive ability
and motor function skills were questioned in the job application because they
are essential functions of the job, the court should find the plaintiffs are able to
perform the essential functions of the job because, for example, plaintiff Daub
answered that he had not experienced “either impaired cognitive ability or
impaired motor function skills as a result of his use of Suboxone.” 137 In
answering this way, Daub has already remarked that he is a qualified individual
who can perform the essential job functions, while still being able to argue other
major life activities are impaired.
B.

An Individual Legally Using Opioids May Have a History of an
Impairment

Under the second prong of having a record of a disability, plaintiffs must
show they were discriminated against because they had a history of an
impairment, such as recurring chronic pain or a history of addiction, which
substantially limited a major life activity. 138 In Ferrari, the court found the
plaintiff did not have a record that the plaintiff’s opioid use constituted an injury
in the past. 139 The court’s conclusory analysis does not take into account the
plaintiff’s underlying condition, which was considered a disability under the first
prong, nor the length of time the plaintiff had taken opioids. Considering the
opioid use was acknowledged as his medical history in his medical record and
this is the reason the plaintiff was not transferred, the court should have spent
more time considering whether the plaintiff’s medical history of opioid use was
the reason for his discrimination.
Although opioids may not traditionally be prescribed long-term due to their
addictive side effects, 140 short-term treatment through opioids may be listed on
medical records, similar to history of addiction. This listing could be harmful for
employment if employees are only protected based on history of addiction, not
history of legally prescribed medications. In EEOC v. Appalachian Wood
Products, Inc., the plaintiffs argue they were also discriminated against based
on history of drug use. 141 Indeed, only after the chiropractor told the defendant
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2006) (amended 2008).
Complaint at 4, supra note 113.
See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B) (2017).
Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 96 F. Supp. 3d 668, 675 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
But see Information About Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm600092.htm (last
updated Feb. 14, 2019) (explaining how buprenorphine, methadone, and naltrexone, when
partnered with psychosocial support, can be safe and effective at treating opioid use disorders and
dependency on a continuing basis).
141. Complaint at 4, supra note 113.
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about Daub’s history of Suboxone use was his application revoked. 142 Because
addiction itself is protected by the ADAAA, Daub would be in a better legal
position under the second prong if he had struggled with a past opioid addiction
(which, coincidentally, he did) than if he was legally taking opioids pursuant to
a prescription. This is because a history of addiction is protected, while a history
of legal prescription drug use is not.
As noted earlier, with the raised awareness of opioid use also comes grave
misperceptions that all use will lead to addiction when, in reality, short-term use
can have positive results for patients. 143 If employers discriminate based on
medical records, such as in Ferrari, plaintiffs will continue to be discriminated
against for legally prescribed treatment or may hide important medical
information from their record to avoid discrimination. This is a policy issue
where plaintiffs would be in a better legal position to abuse the drugs than to
take them as prescribed because, if drug use or its effects are written on patients’
records in the future, recovery from addiction would be covered while prescribed
use would not. If the court finds this is not in violation of the ADAAA, the
consequence could hinder an employee’s ability to seek treatment or disclose
legally prescribed drug use to other doctors, fearing that doing so could lead to
discrimination. To encourage free flow of information between doctors and
patients and to ensure compliance with legal usage of opioids, the court should
protect medical records in terms of drug history, including prescribed treatment.
Taking this into consideration, courts should apply the second prong to
protect medical records that include histories of legally prescribed treatments.
Additionally, the second prong requires that the plaintiff show an impacted
major life activity, thus facing the same problem as under the first prong. 144 To
avoid this barrier, the plaintiff may instead have a stronger argument under the
third prong.
C. An Individual Legally Using Opioids May Be Regarded as Disabled
With the prevalence of employer misperceptions, if a plaintiff cannot meet
one of the above prongs because he or she cannot show a substantial limitation
of a major life activity, the third prong is likely the strongest argument.
Historically, though, plaintiffs have still faced issues under this prong.
Even under Ferrari, the court held the plaintiff was not regarded as disabled
because the impairment was only transitory. 145 Because the plaintiff could be
weaned off the opioids within three to four months, the legal treatment was not
protected as a disability. 146 According to Paragraph (3)(B) of Section 12102 of
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 5.
Szubiak, supra note 37, at 10.
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–(B) (2017).
Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 96 F. Supp. 3d 668, 675 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2019]

PAINFULLY PRESCRIBED

145

the Act, the third prong does not apply to “impairments that are transitory and
minor,” which means the duration is six months or less. 147 The court did not
consider whether the opioid use would be protected as an episodic disability, nor
did it explain why the impairments were considered “minor” if they were
sufficient to prevent work. The court’s interpretation, in limiting protection to
those who use legally prescribed opioids for over six months, might encourage
users to prolong use to be regarded as disabled. The decision might also
discourage following treatment by not taking prescribed opioids in order to
prevent being regarded as a drug user and still not being covered by the ADAAA
because the use is transitory.
Under EEOC v. Appalachian Wood Products, Inc., the plaintiffs argue the
defendant failed to hire job applicants that were regarded as disabled under the
third prong. 148 In fact, the complaint says, “Defendant regarded Daub as having
a disability by disqualifying him and denying him hire because of his nontransitory and non-minor impairment, past drug addiction, drug addiction
recovery and related medical treatment.” 149 In this way, the plaintiffs are trying
to avoid the Ferrari reasoning by arguing the past addiction and current legal
use are not simply transitory, particularly by arguing the plaintiff abused drugs
for years and was using Suboxone, which does not affect just minor
impairments, for treatment. By making this argument, the plaintiffs are more in
line with our current understanding of legal treatment—that the positive effects
of legal treatment are established for short-term use and such use can be
incredibly beneficial to diminish long-term pain.
Additionally, as a matter of public policy, courts should interpret drug use
as episodic, rather than transitory, to avoid prolonged use for better legal
standing and disability protection. Even if the use was under six months, given
the misperceptions of opioid treatment, it is possible that the defendant falsely
classified the plaintiffs as current recurring illegal drug users and did not, at the
time of revoking the offer, regard the plaintiffs as having “transitory” use of
legal treatment. Therefore, the court should find that the use was not regarded as
transitory.
V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
If EEOC v. Appalachian Wood Products, Inc. does not find in favor of the
plaintiffs, but rather, the court finds for the ability to discriminate based on legal
opioid treatment, the effect could deter employees from seeking relieving
treatment. These employees may be incentivized to hide such treatment from
important resources, such as employer physicians. If patients are deterred from
using opioids as treatment because of lack of protection from adverse
147. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 12102(3)(B).
148. See Complaint at 3, supra note 113.
149. Id. at 4.
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employment actions, they may instead face chronic pain, addiction, pain from
cancer treatment, or many of the health issues legal opioid treatment is
prescribed to diminish.
Based on our new understandings of opioid side effects, the potential relief
for patients needing short-term use, the danger in incentivizing long-term use,
and common misconceptions that could lead to more adverse employment
decisions, courts should embrace the ADAAA’s more expansive disability
definition to cover legal opioid treatment. By doing so, the judicial system would
offer protection for medically-prescribed use in a way that would be monitored
by physicians. Even though it may add a small upfront cost to employers,
expanding the ADA’s definition of disability would reduce employee pain and
drug abuse while improving work productivity and long-term treatment results.
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